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1. Introduction
Common perceptions of the wartime Japanese 
state tend to highlight its oppressive policies toward 
culture.  As supporters of this idea, some researchers 
of modern Japanese history have focused on how the 
state controlled thought, censored the media, closed 
theaters, and banned entertainment⑴.  These examples 
might suggest that the state constrained people’s abil-
ity to enjoy autonomous activities in order to gear up 
for total mobilization.  This widely shared interpreta-
tion ignores the subtle approaches that the state took 
toward culture.
This paper examines how the state attempted to 
shape appropriate aspects of culture so as to contribute 
to the war effort.  The state employed cultural pro-
grams to renovate the nation into a corporatist body. 
While disputing Western materialism and capitalistic 
selfishness, Japanese leaders educated the people to 
work for a public purpose rather than for private inter-
est.  The German concept of the leadership principle 
(Führerprinzip)⑵ was useful for the Japanese leaders 
seeking to discipline the people as a body for group 
activities and to cultivate an ideal of harmony and 
public spiritedness.  Emulating Nazi German cultural 
policy, Japanese officials and intellectuals encouraged 
indigenous values like sacrifice for the community, 
obedience, thrift, public order, and cooperation.  In 
order to practice those ideas among the people, Japa-
nese bureaus used various cultural fields of film, 
literature, mass media, music, arts, and tourism⑶.  And 
those cultural policies functioned as the government’s 
propaganda strategy for mobilizing people’s willing 
support of the state’s goal⑷.
I focus on how the state spread its own idea of 
culture through the practice of the people’s theater 
movement (kokumin engeki undo-).  As a part of cul-
tural movement, theater played a role in attracting the 
people’s attention to the state’s goal of war mobiliza-
tion.  The state expanded amateur theater (shiro-to 
engeki) and mobile theater (ido- engeki) movements as 
effective social campaigns at the peak of the war.  The 
people learned and practiced the state’s ideologies by 
performing and watching theater programs.
The wartime theater movement suggests an 
enduring pattern of state-society relations in Japan.  I 
found that the Japanese state’s negotiation with vari-
ous theater groups, and the state’s involvement of the 
private sector in the public realm, characterized Japan’
s cultural practice in general.  Instead of owning the 
entertainment industry, like its Nazi counterpart, the 
Japanese state took indirect control of theater and 
mobilized much human/material resources from cul-
tural specialists (bunkajin⑸), private theaters, and 
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ordinary people.  The specific theater project initiated 
by the state exemplifies the fact that Japanese officials 
did not take an entirely top-down method in carrying 
out cultural policy.  Consequently, the state’s negotia-
tion with theater producers and audiences who pursued 
autonomous activities paved the way for success in 
war mobilization.  The first section discusses Japan’s 
acquisition of Nazi German cultural policy, and in the 
ensuing sections, I discuss Japan’s actual practice of 
culture through the promotion of amateur theater and 
mobile theater movements.
2.  Japan Emulates the Nazi German 
Cultural Programs
The wartime Japanese government used culture 
to reshape the nation into a corporatist state.  The 
dilemmas of Western-led industrialization and mod-
ernization under the Great Depression during the 
1930s influenced Japan, which faced increasing eco-
nomic tens ions , labor d isputes , and soc ia l 
fragmentation.  Japanese social bureaucrats in the 
Home Ministry and some Marxist scholars like Miki 
Kiyoshi in the Showa Research Association (Sho-wa 
Kenkyu-kai) perceived that the existing condition con-
stituted a crisis in modern politics.  The SRA was a 
brain trust organized by future Prime Minister Konoe 
Fumimaro-⑹, and tried to reform the structure of the 
nation state.  Progressive members of the SRA did not 
cast off modernization itself but considered alternative 
methods to solve common problems of capitalism in 
the corporatist ideology.  They believed that by estab-
lishing a cooperative body of the Japanese nation 
through the state-led “New Order” structure, Japanese 
and East Asian nations could create social harmony 
free from Western control⑺.
However, these progressive camps in Japan had a 
contradictory attitude toward the West.  While they 
endeavored to be independent of Western influence, 
Japanese leaders adopted from the West their method-
ology for renovating the nation.  Japanese civil 
servants and intellectuals researched the cultural poli-
cies of Western developed countries, and tried to find 
the best model.  Japanese researchers were not satis-
fied with the cultural programs of the United States 
where private organizations took a leadership role. 
They preferred the models of Western European coun-
tries, which exhibited relatively strong centralization. 
In Europe, the public institutions, religious organiza-
tions, and governments expanded cultural programs⑻. 
Some Japanese researchers also looked to the Opera 
Nazionale Dopolavoro (OND, literally “After Work”), 
which organized programs for leisure activities in Fas-
cist Italy.  However, the Italian case proved not to be 
sufficient for those who wished to establish a corpo-
ratist state in which no conflict existed between the 
state and society.  Italian ministries and big companies 
organized ONDs, yet maintained separate manage-
ment and thus lacked unification among ONDs.
Japanese researchers selected the German model 
rather than the Italian or other European models 
because they believed it be an ideal type of a corporat-
ist state.  Indeed, Japan’s corporatist ideology was not 
distinctively Japanese, but rather the emulation of the 
German ideal of a classless Volksgemeinschaft.  The 
Japanese had similar ideas to the Germans that nations 
can have freedom only when the people work for the 
public good.  Gonda Yasunosuke and Kondo-  Haruo, 
Japanese ethnographers of popular culture and theater, 
were fascinated with the Kraft durch Freude (KdF, lit-
erally “Strength through Joy”), the state-controlled 
leisure organization in the Third Reich.  The KdF was 
a part of a corporatist organization of the German 
Labor Front (die Deutsche Arbeitsfront).  On Novem-
ber 27, 1933, Dr. Robert Ley, the leader of the Labor 
Front set up the KdF in order to inspire a sense of 
community or public-spiritedness (Gemeinnutz geht 
vor Eigennutz⑼).  KdF presented diverse programs 
through its divisions of the Bureau of Sports (Spor-
tamt), the Bureau of Travel, Walking, and Vacation 
(Amt für Reisen, Wandern und Urlaub), the Bureau of 
Entertainment (Amt Feierabend), the Bureau of Social 
Education (Amt Deutsches Volksbildungswerk), and 
the Bureau of the Beauty of Labor (Amt Schönheit der 
Arbeit).  KdF encouraged the people to participate in 
collective activities like tours, sports, and cleaning up 
of the village, and the Bureau of Entertainment dis-
patched mobile theaters (Wanderbühne) to local cities 
and the countryside to inspire in the people the ideol-
ogy of cooperation⑽.
The above German programs to uplift the morale 
of workers, youth, and peasants suggested to the Japa-
nese counterparts that state ideology should be more 
than abstract concepts or rhetoric.  Similarly, Japanese 
reformists believed that the ideology of the New Order 
should be implanted and practiced among the people, 
and by doing so, new policies could win the people’s 
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minds (kokumin no shinri).  On October 12, 1940, the 
Second Konoe cabinet (July 22, 1940-July 16, 1941) 
set up the Imperial Rule Assistance Association (Taisei 
Yokusankai; hereafter IRAA) within the Division of 
Information (Jo-ho-bu), which expanded into the 
Bureau of Information (Jo-ho-  Kyoku) on December 6, 
1940.  The IRAA aimed to make the whole Japanese 
nation serve the public (shokuiku ho-ko-) and to abandon 
selfishness (shiko-) or private mindedness (shi) under 
the state-led corporatist structure of a New System 
(shin taisei).  By reforming a society that had been 
centered on liberalism and capitalism into one con-
trolled by the state, the IRAA believed it could 
establish the people’s morality (kokumin do-toku)⑾.
Japan’s cultural policy was not planned only by 
career officials.  The Japanese officials involved 
prominent figures in arts and entertainment as com-
mentators for the state’s cultural policy.  Both career 
officials and non-bureaucratic cultural specialists asso-
ciated with the IRAA undertook a “positive guidance” 
(shido-/josei no sekkyoku shugi) for renovating the Jap-
anese nation⑿.  Kishida Kunio, a playwright, was one 
of the main activists.  After he came back to Japan 
from France where he had studied theater, Kishida 
committed himself to politics and designed a far-
reaching cultural policy throughout the war period. 
Kishida became a chief of the Division of Culture 
(Bunkabu) in the IRAA by the recommendation of 
Miki Kiyoshi⒀.
Like other cultural reformers, such as Gonda and 
Kondo- , Kishida wished to emulate aspects of the KdF. 
What attracted Kishida the most was the fact that Ger-
many applied theater to renovating its national polity. 
The Third Reich integrated theater under the state’s 
control.  It promulgated a national theater law (Reichs-
theatergesetz) in 1934, and under this law, it 
designated a large budget for theater; the state’s 
expenditure for theater in 1934 was 58,500,000 
marks⒁.  With this budget, Germany established many 
theaters run by the state, including the Theater des 
Volkes in Berlin, to provide plays to people at reason-
able prices.  While entrance fees for the opera were 
generally 3 to 25 marks, KdF members were able to 
enjoy it for only 75 pennies to 4 marks⒂.  Also, the 
state covered the average of 61.42 percent deficit suf-
fered by theater management during the year of 1934 
and 1935⒃.  Along with strong support from the state, 
the KdF expanded activities enormously and facili-
tated greater participation.  Both the number of events 
that the KdF hosted and the number of participants 
increased from 1934 to 1938: the total number of 
events increased from 24,672 in 1934 to 144,434 in 
1938, while the total number of participants also 
increased from 9,111,663 in 1934 to 54,568,467 over 
the same years⒄.
Kishida, as an ambitious playwright himself, wel-
comed the German case where he saw the central role 
of theater in politics.  Because it would integrate such 
diverse artistic fields as music, dance, literature, and 
pictures on stage, Kishida believed that the theater 
would be the most effective art form to define a 
nation-state’s culture concisely (cho-kanzu)⒅.  The 
establishment of a new theater system controlled by 
the state could especially serve as the machinery to 
educate the people to follow the rules of the commu-
nity as well as to discipline them in rituals (girei) of 
collectivity⒆.  Furthermore, training the Japanese as a 
great people (rippana Nihonjin) was important in ren-
ovating the state’s image in the external world⒇. 
Kishida argued that militaristic occupation and expan-
sion in Asia was not enough to secure Japan’s defense. 
To establish a Japanese high-level defensive state 
(ko-do kokubo- kokka)�, it should not only be militarily 
“strong” (tsuyoku) but also culturally “beautiful” 
(utsukushii).  Only when Japan expressed its cultural 
ability to guide the “backward” Asian nations, would 
they voluntarily follow the leader�.  Thus, Japanese 
should express their dignity (hin’i) and prestige (ishin) 
as the leader of Asia�, and each Japanese should prop-
erly know that daily behaviors were connected to the 
making of the state’s image (kokufu-)�.  In short, to 
beautify [Japan] meant to increase its power (bi mo 
mata chikara nari)�.
On December 21, 1939, the Japanese Ministry of 
Education (Monbusho-) set up a committee to discuss 
the rehabilitation of the theater, the cinema, and enter-
tainment (engeki, eiga, goraku nado kaizen iinkai)�. 
Among twenty-five committee members, most of 
them were prominent specialists in the fields of the-
ater, film, and entertainment, including Konda 
Yasunosuke, Kishida Kunio, and Kawatake 
Shigetoshi, the director of the Theater Museum in 
Waseda University, while three were bureaucrats from 
the Ministry of Education: Omura Seiichi, the vice-
minister, Tanaka Shigeyuki, the chief of the Bureau of 
Social Education, and Fuwa Suketoshi, the officer in 
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the Bureau of Social Education.  The theater division 
of the committee held a meeting once a week and dis-
cussed the state’s policy on theater.  On November 26, 
1940, the committee submitted the first draft of its the-
ater renovation plan to the minister of Education.  The 
members stressed the state’s overarching control over 
actors, directors, agencies, and promotion, by estab-
lishing public institutions or schools for theater as well 
as the enactment of theater law (engeki ho-)�.
The Japanese government failed, however, to 
enact theater law or to establish public institutions for 
theater as Nazi Germany did.  This contrast may be 
explained in part by the fact that the Bureau of Social 
Education made personnel changes, and reshuffled 
Tanaka Shigeyuki and Oda Naritsugu, the head of a 
Section of Adult Education (Seijin Kyo-iku Ka), both 
of whom worked on introducing a bill for theater 
law�.  More critically, the IRAA experienced strug-
gles in acquiring its own budget.  Conservative 
political groups like the National Polity Protection 
Alliance (Kokutai Yo-go Ren’go-kai) and Hatoyama 
faction denounced this new political system organized 
by Konoe, saying that it was based on “communism” 
(kominterun no teeze) and thus violated the imperial 
constitution.  The criticism aroused disputes against 
establishing a budget for the IRAA, and the Imperial 
Diet (teikoku gikai) rejected the proposal of 
37,000,000 yen and decided to provide the IRAA with 
only 8,000,000 yen for the year of 1941�.
In this situation, if the IRAA were to establish a 
formal institution and law for the direct control of the-
ater, it would need to furnish strong leadership and 
funds.  Even though German theater policies were 
extremely attractive to some Japanese officials, their 
Japanese counterparts did not have to completely 
adopt the same form as in Germany.  Instead, the 
IRAA found an alternative way of controlling theater 
by cultivating traditional norms and values of coopera-
tion and sacrifice.  It collaborated with autonomous 
theater groups and mobilized the people’s participa-
tion in a nation wide theater movement.  The state 
educated the people through theater on how to reno-
vate culture, and the people learned broadly how to 
use time and resources effectively, to assuage fatigue, 
to endure the hardships of the war, to regulate con-
sumption, and to promote savings.
3.  Work (kinrō), Entertainment  
(goraku), and Amateur Theater 
(shirōto engeki)
Theater was integrated into the state’s labor pol-
icy under the war economy.  Prominent Japanese 
economists and theater specialists agreed that labor 
disputes were more than an economic problem, and 
they raised the issue of adopting entertainment to 
improve work efficiency.  They understood that labor-
ers would express complaints if the government and 
company managers only focused on overworking 
workers.  Exhorting workers to endure hardship would 
not be sufficient to raise productivity�.  Thus, O- ko-chi 
Kazuo, professor in the Department of Economics at 
the Imperial University of Tokyo, stressed the critical 
role of leisure (kyu-yo-) at workplaces.  O- ko-chi pointed 
out the fact that Japanese industries had exploited 
female workers in developing the spinning industry 
and textile industries, under the phrases of “move 
Japan forward” (yakushin nippon) and “increase 
export” (bo-eki shincho-).  These female workers did 
not have any leisure because they were worked too 
hard.  Most light industries in Japan did not provide 
welfare, and thus created poor workplace environ-
ments.  This affected workers’ health conditions and 
brought about a decrease in both efficiency and qual-
ity�.  As a cultural economist, O- ko-chi regarded 
consumption (sho-hi) as a prerequisite for production. 
This meant that as far as it contributed to enhancing 
labor power, spending time on leisure would not be 
wasteful consumption.  Leisure could be a safe device 
for the state to prevent worker’s outrage and to facili-
tate production by giving them energy to labor day 
after day.  Accordingly, the state should not discourage 
all forms consumption�.
In May 1940, the state set up the Society for the 
Study of Theater for Workers (Kinro-sha Engeki 
Kenkyu-kai) within the Kyo-cho-kai (Harmonization 
Society)�.  The Kyo-cho-kai was a semi-governmental 
organization set up in December 1919 for the purpose 
of promoting harmony between labor and manage-
ment.  This organization was a sophisticated device of 
the Japanese social bureaucrats to preclude radical 
labor movements that increased after World War I. 
Japanese officials, prominent industrialists, and aca-
demic specialists served on the board of directors and 
educated laborers in the “spirit of cooperation�.”  The 
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Kyo-cho-kai established the Society to urge workers to 
organize their off-work time around leisure and enter-
tainment activities at the workplace.  State officials 
and the most representative scholars, artists, and crit-
ics in the field of theater in Japan joined the Society: 
Sonoike Kin’naru and Senga Akira from the Bureau of 
Information, Endo-  Shingo from the IRAA, and Ito-  
Kisaku from the Japanese Federation of Mobile The-
ater.  These figures, changing the name of the Society 
for the Study of Theater for Workers into the Society 
for the Study of Theater at the Workplace (Shokuba no 
Engeki Kenkyu-kai) in February 1942, expanded the-
ater programs for workers�.
Theater specialists in the Society had a leftist 
stance and previously promoted the New Theater 
(shin’geki) movement in the 1920s.  Tsubouchi Sho-yo-  
in fact had been the leading figure in the progressive 
theater, and had expressed his interest in social prob-
lems on stage, like the strikes of urban laborers and 
rural peasants that lurked behind the façade of modern 
life.  The new theater groups led by Tsubouchi devel-
oped public theater (ko-kyo-geki) and pageant theaters. 
But they pursued somewhat art-oriented (geijutsu shijo-
shugi) theater, and only small numbers of the 
intelligentsia were involved with the New Theater�. 
Along with nationalistic sentiments in the 1930s, the 
state increased its oppression toward leftist ideology 
and dissolved these new theater groups�.
It is ironic then that former leftists actively partic-
ipated in the state-initiated amateur theater movement. 
However, those progressives expected their ideals to 
be achieved under the new theater system (engeki shin 
taisei) by renovating the current entertainment for the 
working people (kinro- kokumin).  In a temporary 
meeting of the IRAA, officials and theater specialists 
pointed out the unbalanced distribution of entertain-
ment.  It was apparent that the countryside had few 
theaters while cities had many.  Commercial theaters 
were blamed for attracting urban bourgeois audiences 
through their profit motive, and this selfishness and 
private interest in turn aroused excessive competition 
among theaters.  Entertainment under the old system 
did not function for factory workers and farmers who 
were, as the cultural reformers regarded, indeed labor-
ing for the state.  Cultural planners emphasized that 
the state was taking care of workers through its control 
(to-sei) of entertainment�.
The Society for the Study of Theater for Workers 
set up a rule not to take entrance fees for amateur the-
ater performance to encourage workers’ easy access. 
If theaters charged entrance fees, they would have to 
pay a high tax.  For example, the tax on entrance fees 
was 10% for ticket prices below one yen per person, 
20% for ticket prices between one and three yen, and 
30% for tickets over three yen�.  In doing so, the state 
proclaimed its support for the producing classes (sei-
san kaikyu-).  It was able to propagate the idea that the 
state’s control was for the people, which was different 
from commercial theater which served the consuming 
class (sho-hi kaikyu-) in cities�.  Of course, the state did 
not intend to evoke leftist theater and to inspire a class 
ideology.  It rather expected to be able to control the 
people, while advocating its efforts to provide the 
working people with welfare and to improve their 
working environment.
Like the German Labor Front, the Japanese state 
incorporated amateur theater activities into the indus-
trial patriotic movement (sanpo- undo-).  Group 
discipline and public order were especially empha-
sized in amateur theater, and the state paid the most 
attention to organizing the people within the coopera-
tive body of community.  The IRAA encouraged 
amateur theater groups to perform only in their own 
working places or villages.  The promotion of the the-
ater would thus be through such corporative 
organizations as the agricultural cooperatives (sangyo- 
kumiai), the youth groups (seinendan), and the 
industrial patriotic units (sanpo-, the abbreviation of 
sangyo- ho-kokukai)�.  These groups were plan-level 
units modeled on German examples.  Translating the 
German concepts of “shop community” (Betriebsge-
meinschaft) and a classless Volksgemeinschaft (nation’
s community), the Japanese cultural planners evoked 
their own indigenous ideal of the organic village (kyo-
do-tai)�.  The Japanese counterpart, furthermore, 
imposed the Japanese cultural characteristic of sim-
plicity on stage in amateur theater.  As opposed to 
commercial theater, amateur theater could not produce 
splendid stage sets, and the running time for each play 
was short at about twenty minutes�.  Indeed, the very 
poor conditions under which these performances were 
conducted, lacking as they did sufficient human 
resources and theatrical accoutrements, was believed 
to cultivate a particularly Japanese cultural virtue. 
Participants in amateur theater would endeavor to 
maximize their limited resources and environment, 
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and thus the amateur stage could be a place to testify 
to the abilities and potentials of Japanese to overcome 
the peak of difficulty (kunan no goku)�.
In detail, the Society for the Study of Theater for 
Workers published guidebooks to explain how to act 
in amateur theater.  It required all the players to main-
tain public order, and to participate in the process of 
making a play, including the writing of scripts, build-
ing stage sets, and cleaning up under the guidance of 
leaders.  This group activity was encouraged to foster 
a consciousness of being a member of the Japanese 
nation, regardless of the players’ social positions, and 
to train the participants to fulfill their own roles in 
groups.  The state expected that this collective activity 
(itchi kyo-ryoku) could inculcate a spirit of cooperation 
(wachu- kyo-do- or kyo-wa no bifu-) with each person tak-
ing responsibility for a role (yaku) at their workplace�.
Adopting the German concept of the Füh-
rerprinzip, the Society called for submission to the 
community.  The guidebooks in fact advised workers 
and farmers to obey their leaders (shikisha) in facto-
ries and plant-level units.  The leader, in turn, should 
control theater participants.  In terms of controlling 
people’s behavior, amateur theater leaders did not　 
have to be theater specialists.  Leaders in the village or 
workplaces could participate in guiding plays�.  In 
any case, however, it was required that leaders be 
qualified as “good” Japanese with upstanding public 
morality (kokumin do-toku).  They were responsible not 
only for play performances but also actors’ manners 
(fu-gi) and personality (jinkaku).  Compared to profes-
sionals in the commercial theater, amateur theater 
directors should have a broader role as leaders to 
guide other participants to behave well on and off-
stage.  Keeping such details as actors’ arrival time, 
running time, rest time, and ending time was empha-
sized as a way to train group activity�.
There were also guidelines regarding models for 
good scripts.  The Society prohibited content such as 
intrigue against the Imperial House, corrupt costumes 
and brutality that evoked crime, and satire and vulgar-
ity�.  It recommended scripts to incorporate daily 
conversations and events from everyday life.  In doing 
so, proper plays under conditions of war were meant 
to deliver the message that even small events in daily 
life could be linked to national benefit and to encour-
age morale at both the workplace and home�.
It is important, however, to note that the state was 
negotiating with the audiences of amateur theater 
groups.  The Society did not take direct control of pro-
grams, but al lowed variat ion in genres and 
presentations.  Comedy was welcomed to make plays 
interesting and to attract ordinary audiences’ attention. 
For example, Tug of War (Bo-oshi) was recommended 
by the Society as a good work.  This play ran eighteen 
minutes, and was performed by members of the Cen-
tral Association of Agricultural Cooperatives (Sangyo-  
Kumiai Chu-o-kai) at the Japan Youth Hall (Nihon 
Seinenkan) in January 1941 and was also widely 
broadcast on the radio.  It was a story about a con-
script, and depicted not only the worries of the family 
left behind but also their hopes for the son who goes 
to the front.
Tetsuji (Younger brother): Why are you 
delaying your marriage?
Sho-ta (Elder brother): It is because I want to 
go to the battlefield without worries when I hap-
pen to get a draft paper (sho-shu-).
Tetsuji:…Don’t you see that everyone, 
whether he has a wife or children, honorably goes 
to the battlefield?…Shizuka-san (fiancée of 
Sho-ta) is a woman of the empire…Would she 
shed tears effeminately even if you leave tomor-
row?
Fujiheiei (Father): Don’t worry…I still have 
the energy to take care of our home while you 
guys are away, and to farm. Go resolutely when 
you get call-up papers (akagami). Go, for the hon-
ored Emperor (tenshi).
Figure 1.　 A scene from Tug of War (Bōoshi).  Source: 
‘Bō oshi’ enshutsu tebiki: kinrōsha engeki 
(Tokyo: Kyōchōkai Sangyō Fukuribu, 1941). 
Courtesy of The National Diet Library.
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This play encouraged the people to willingly serve the 
state by joining in the nation’s glorious struggle or by 
dying a proud death.  But, actors did not explicitly 
embody war spirit, and militarism was not pervasive 
in this script.  During the most of the play, actors were 
simply talking about their marriages, gossiping, and 
describing their families with a comic and bright 
touch, all while playing a game of tug of war.  They 
only incorporated messages of the war effort into their 
conversations briefly at the end�.
Thus, the state was flexible in arranging the con-
tent of programs, whereas it was strict toward 
community activities in theater promotion.  The state’s 
ideal to construct a great Japanese culture meant pro-
grams to amuse the people to endure the hardships of 
the war.  That said, merely repeating serious talk about 
the war effort was not effective in attracting the people 
to the theater.  In most of the cases, what the ordinary 
Japanese people enjoyed making and watching was 
often not up to these lofty standards.  Many amateur 
plays imitated professional entertainment, and they 
presented revues, sword fights, popular songs, and 
comic dialogues (manzai).  Moreover, one critical 
problem that was often raised was workers’ violations 
of the state’s guidelines for amateur theater.  In 1941, 
the Division of Culture in the IRAA announced its 
research on current amateur theater affairs, and 
pointed out that some workers went to other villages 
or working places, and made earnings through perfor-
mances�.  It is clear that the state did not always 
control the actual practice, and this contradiction 
within Japanese cultural policy was most apparent in 
mobile theaters because of the mediation of private 
commerce.
4.  The Mobile Theater Movement  
(idō engeki undō) and the War  
Mobilization
One)  The Expansion of the State’s Ideology 
via the Mobile Theater
Mobile theater shared similarities with amateur 
theater.  In principle, commercialism was not allowed 
in those theaters because it pursued both private inter-
est and consumption.  Those theaters denounced 
individualism and aimed at harmonious group activity 
(shu-dan waraku no yorokobi) within certain regions 
and workplaces.  Also, they were entertainment for/
among the “working people” (kinro-sha), with an 
expectation of helping increase their productivity 
(zo-san gekirei undo-)�.
However, “touring” differentiated the nature of 
mobile theater from that of amateur theater.  To dis-
patch theaters from the center to local areas 
necessitated considerable resources, and it became a 
critical issue for the Japanese state to mobilize funds. 
Japanese cultural planners understood the effective 
function of mobile theater under war conditions after 
they researched Wanderbühne initiated by the Bureau 
of Entertainment in Nazi Germany.  Mobile theater 
played a role as a public media through which the state 
was able to make relatively easy contact with the “iso-
lated people” in remote places far from the central 
government.  Visiting officials and theater groups 
delivered the state’s ideas on war’s purpose to the 
local people, and they also reported local conditions to 
offices in the cities.  Identical in purpose to Wander-
bühne, the Japanese mobile theater was designed to 
cultivate the indigenous moral virtue of mutual coop-
eration between the state and society.
Autonomous theater groups were motivated to 
cooperate with the state’s project.  The war situation 
called on commercial theaters to share burdens for the 
state and people.  The state had been often criticizing 
commercial theaters for their pursuit of profit (eiri 
shugi), and contentment with the “old” system.  The-
ater was expected to thereafter provide service for the 
public good.  Because of the criticism from the state, 
commercial theaters first attempted to cut down their 
entrance fees so as to demonstrate their openness to 
the low-income classes.  This led instead to a reduc-
tion in the number of performances to deal with any 
decreased profits and increased unemployment, and 
this tactic especially threatened the livelihood of 
nameless actors.  Organizing mobile theater, from the 
perspective of commercial theaters, could be expected 
to appease criticism from the state as well as to solve 
their unemployment problem.  Some denounced the 
intentions of commercial theaters as based on oppor-
tunism, suggesting that they sought to profit from 
cooperation with the state (kokusaku binjo-).  Others 
simply disregarded mobile theater actors as nuisances 
(hana tsumami) for top managers of theaters or famous 
actors because they did not provide financial benefits 
to the company.  In any case, theaters decided to orga-
nize mobile theater troupes to provide unemployed 
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actors with chances to work, and to show that they 
were laboring for the state�.
Commercial theater companies managed by 
Kobayashi Ichizo- , the president of the Hankyu-  Rail-
way Co., were the first to organize groups for mobile 
theater activities.  First, on September 27, 1940, To-ho-  
formed the To-ho-  Mobile Culture Corps (To-ho-  Ido-  
Bunkatai; hereafter, the Corps), followed by other big 
theaters like Sho-chiku and Yoshimoto. <Figure 2.> 
Under the leadership of Matsubara Eiji, a To-ho-  actor, 
the Corps culled its members from To-ho-  Theater 
(To-ho-  Gekidan), To-ho-  Dance Corps (To-ho-  Buyo-tai), 
and To-ho-  Orchestra�.  These To-ho-  groups communi-
cated messages that they were leading (sossen) welfare 
and cultural movements for the people (kokumin ko-sei 
undo-, kokumin bunka sokushin undo-) by organizing 
the Corps.  They claimed to be providing the “indus-
trial warrior” (kinro- senshi) in the countryside, 
factories, and mines with “healthy” theater, which was 
meant to contribute to “expanding productivity, cheer-
ing up, and nourishing life.”  These companies 
proclaimed that they were selling their labor as a pub-
lic service (ko-eki) to the nation through theater (engeki 
ho-koku)�.
Since its first performance at the Hibiya Public 
Hall (Hibiya Ko-kaido-) in Tokyo on October 19, 1940, 
the Corps held several performances in the Tokyo area 
hosted by Tokyo city and several of its wards (ku). 
Also, the Corps held its first provincial performance in 
Nagano prefecture on January 21, 1941.  Touring 
many regions in the Japanese isles, the Corps partici-
pated in social events to promote savings, to increase 
food and coal production, and to comfort the people in 
disaster areas�.
To cover the Western areas (kansai) of Japan, the 
Takarazuka Girls’ Revue organized a mobile troupe. 
The Revue created a small team called the Takarazuka 
Music Service Corps (Takarazuka Ongaku Ho-shitai), 
which mainly consisted of newcomers.  Later on, the 
Revue increased the number of actors and musicians 
in the troupe, and added stars and famous singers�. 
Later changing its name to Takarazuka Song-Dance 
Service Corps (Takarazuka Sho-bu Ho-shitai) and 
Takarazuka Revue Mobile Corps (Takarazuka Kageki 
Ido-tai), the Revue provided popular song, dance, and 
variety shows to the people in factories and hospitals. 
The girls in the Revue visited the Glico factory and 
Matsushita Electronics (Matsushita Denki), and taught 
workers national songs and dances such as kokumin 
shingunka (marching song of the people), sangyo- 
ho-kokuka (song of the industrial patriotic units), and 
kenkoku ondo (the lead-in song for the founding of a 
nation).  In addition to Western Japan, they also 
actively visited industrial areas in Kawasaki city and 
Kanagawa prefecture�. <Figure 3.>
However, the state was not yet entirely satisfied 
that a couple of prominent theaters began to organize 
mobile theaters.  Both the officials and theater special-
ists in the IRAA understood that public service 
eventually would not be the primary goal of commer-
cial theaters and that each private theater would 
hesitate to continue its tour if the tour did not bring 
about much profit.  Thus, they considered “laissez-
faire” to be unreliable�.  Starting from February 1941, 
the Division of Culture in the IRAA made frequent 
discussions with the top managers of theaters and offi-
cials in the Bureau of Information on the issue of 
integrating current troupes into the corporatist struc-
ture directed by the state.  The participants of the 
meeting thought that through one corporate body, the-
aters could be fairly distributed into local areas�.  On 
Figure 2.　 The Tōhō Mobile Culture Corps (Tōhō Idō 
Bunkatai).  Source: Toho jūnenshi (Tokyo: 
Tokyo Takarazuka Gekijō, 1943).  Courtesy 
of Toho Company Ltd. (The image is partly 
edited by the contributor.)
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June 9, 1941, the Bureau of Information and the IRAA 
established the Japanese Federation of Mobile The-
aters (Nippon Ido-  Engeki Renmei; hereafter, the 
Federation), a corporate organization.  Kishida Kunio 
became chairman (iincho-) of the Federation, and Ito-  
Kisaku, a prominent figure in the field of stage man-
agement, became bureau chief (jimukyokucho-)�.  The 
Japanese representative figures from the Cabinet, cor-
porative organizations, commercial theaters, and 
media participated as members of the Federation. 
They included: 1) officials from the Bureau of Infor-
mation, the IRAA, and several ministries; 2) 
corporative organizations such as the Great Japan 
Industrial Patriotic Units (Dai-Nippon Sangyo-  
Ho-kokukai), the Central Association of Agricultural 
Cooperatives, the Cultural Association of Farming and 
Fishing (No-sangyoson Bunka Kyo-kai), and the Great 
Japan Youth Group (Dai-Nippon Seisho-nendan); 3) 
commercial theaters such as To-ho- , Sho-chiku, Yoshi-
moto, and Shinko-; and 4) Tokyo Daily Newspaper 
(Tokyo Nichinichi Shinbun) and Osaka Daily News-
paper (Osaka Mainichi Shinbun).  The Federation 
consisted of six departments of distribution, produc-
tion, propaganda, education, research, general affairs, 
and accounting.  With official and non-official sup-
port, the Federation was able to incorporate the current 
mobile troupes into the affiliated theater groups (kamei 
gekidan)�.
Mobile theater activity was a state-initiated cul-
tural movement.  Accordingly, state officials believed 
that Japanese culture should be distributed only 
through the state’s network.  Corresponding with cor-
porative organizations and theaters, the Federation 
arranged schedules and checked the routes of perfor-
mance.  The state controlled both supply and demand 
of theater productions�, because it allowed only affili-
ated theaters to provide their plays to the working 
people while only corporative organizations were able 
to host mobile theaters.  The state’s authorization dif-
ferentiated mobile theater from autonomous itinerant 
troupes (tabimawari), which had been performing 
without any control from the state�.
At the same time, Japanese culture was shaped 
through the state’s control of the actors’ bodies.  Lead-
ers of the Federation argued that the very practice of 
group training (dantai rensei) demonstrated the char-
acteristics of the Japanese culture.  This was not 
invoked by tabimawari troupes because they did not 
emphasize actors’ behaviors off-stage.  Similar to 
amateur theater, discipline was an important issue for 
mobile theater.  The Federation emphasized that the 
disciplined attitude (setsudo) of actors would become 
Figure 3.　 Performances in the countryside.  Source: Toho jūnenshi (Tokyo: Tokyo 
Takarazuka Gekijō, 1943).  Courtesy of Toho Company Ltd.
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the basis from which Japanese culture would be prop-
agated (bunka fukyu-).  It was required that actors 
behave as models (mohan) of good people (rippana 
kokumin) because they could influence the local peo-
ple during their stay.  Thus, actors were to present 
good performances off-stage as well.  With this pur-
pose, from mid June to early July in 1941, the 
Federation held comprehensive education programs to 
train actors as leaders of cultural propaganda.  The 
program included not only publ ic moral i ty 
(ko-shu- do-toku) but also daily etiquette.  For example, 
they were instructed to say itadakimasu (I will help 
myself) and gochiso-sama (I have enjoyed the dish 
very much) before and after having a meal, and to 
salute (keirei) when they passed by shrines (jinja). 
The program also trained actors in time management, 
physical drills, and duties in cleaning, dining, and bed-
ding.  These trainings were designed to bind 
individuals together into a group.  Also, mobile theater 
actors were required to wear a national uniform (koku-
min fuku) and perform solemn national ceremonies 
(kokumin girei) before their main performances.  They 
were required to worship the Imperial House (ko-kyo 
yo-hai), perform silent prayer (mokuto-) for the soldiers, 
and sing a national song (kokka seisho-), ending with 
banzai ho-sho- (shouting “long live the emperor!”).  In 
the sense of disciplining the body, performing mobile 
theater was beyond mere entertainment.  By practicing 
this collective ritual, the Federation expected to inspire 
in actors ideas of endurance (nintai) and self-control 
(kokki)�.
Audiences also participated in the practice of cul-
ture.  After watching theater performance, the local 
people and actors organized “informal discussions” 
(kondan). Participants not only reviewed stage perfor-
mances themselves, but also discussed how to manage 
their household, to keep public order, and to discipline 
their bodies.  Off stage actors were supposed to edu-
cate their audiences in their daily practices.  Those off-
stage performances were encouraged in the example 
of practicing air raid evacuation drills, too.  The hosts 
were required to mobilize audiences in an orderly 
fashion through “neighborhood associations” (cho-nai-
kai and tonarigumi) .  With the end of each 
performance, the Bureau of Research (cho-sakyoku) in 
the Federation distributed questionnaires to check the 
details of the group training.  Those questionnaires 
included not only audiences’ comments on perfor-
mances but also the method of mobilizing audiences 
and the behavior of actors and audiences.  They 
became critical documents for the Federation to over-
see the actual outcome of the discipline training�.
Besides the off-stage rules, the Federation also 
designed guidelines for theater promotion.  The Feder-
ation considered “touring” to be the specific condition 
of mobile theater.  In 1941, the Federation set up the 
following rules for mobile theater scenarios: the run-
ning time should be from thirty minutes to an hour; 
the number of characters should be no more than ten 
people; stage equipment should be easy to carry; and 
the content of the script should be interesting to amuse 
the audiences.  It also recommended that the running 
time for the whole performance be three to three and a 
half hours�.
Under the guidance of the state, the mobile the-
ater movement expanded all around Japan.  During the 
year of 1941 when the state set up the Federation in 
June, Japan had a total number of 1,071 tours and per-
formed to a total audience of 1,411,675 people.  This 
meant that three or four troupes had recitals everyday 
somewhere in Japan, and daily mobilized about 3,870 
people as audiences�.  Also, during the two and half 
years after the Federation was established, the mobile 
theater movement achieved the following results: a 
total itinerary spanning 612,200 km, 3,500 perfor-
mances, and a total audience numbering 4,498,000. 
To further enumerate, from June 1941 to August 1943, 
each commercial troupe provided the following num-
ber of performances: 304 by the first team of Sho-chiku 
Kokumin, 126 by the second team of Sho-chiku Koku-
min, 332 by To-ho-  Mobile Culture Corps, 310 by 
Yoshimoto Mobile Theater, 318 by Sho-chiku Kansai, 
463 by Takarazuka Revue, and 75 by Kansai Yoshi-
moto�.  Activities performed by the Corps and the 
Revue were noticeable.  The Corps had a total number 
of 488 performances from October 1940 to December 
1943.  It participated in 181 events hosted by the agri-
cultural cooperatives, 114 by the industrial patriotic 
units, 133 by the IRAA, and 60 by others�.  The 
Revue also held a hundred performances during 1941, 
which increased to a total number of 495 perfor-
mances and mobilized a total audience of 729,000 
people during 1943.  This meant that the Revue per-
formed on average at least once a day and mobilized 
audiences of about 1,470 people each time�.
It was ironic that service (ho-shi) to the state was 
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only possible with the firm support of commercial the-
aters, which were often denounced as a part of Western 
cultural influence�.  Commercial theater was 
deployed as a powerful instrument to mobilize the 
people, and that was why the state did not close the-
aters until the very last stage of the war�.  In 1944, the 
mobile theater movement saw its peak with a total 
audience of 4,580,000 people in Japan�.  The Federa-
tion succeeded in impartially distributing mobile 
theaters to diverse local areas without focusing on any 
particular region.  In short, the expansion of the 
mobile theater movement was possible only through 
the state’s involvement of the private sector in the 
public realm.  Japanese officials and theater specialists 
negotiated with both theater providers and audiences. 
Behind the success in terms of the quantity of perfor-
mances, however, the mobile theater movement had 
its own dilemmas and problems.
Two)  Dilemmas and Negotiations of the 
Mobile Theater Movement
The “success” of the expanding mobile theater 
movement partly derived from overworking (ju-ro-do-) 
actors.  The theater companies were not motivated to 
consider their laborers’ welfare because most of the 
mobile theater actors came from non-popular groups. 
Indeed, mobile theater activities required physical 
strength.  Troupes moved around nationwide, and 
schedules were tight.  Because it was difficult to 
revisit the same place, when it went to an area, a 
troupe normally had one or two performances around 
the area every day over a span of a week or ten days�. 
Also, because the size of troupes was so small – they 
generally consisted of less than twenty members – 
actors were obliged to handle other tasks besides their 
main job of stage performance.  When they arrived at 
a region, actors worked on stage sets by themselves. 
After performances, they participated in social activi-
ties with the local people, and wrapped up their 
facilities to move onto another region.  Their main 
concerns were how to rationalize their equipment and 
utilize simple stages sets.  Poor working conditions 
also tired them out.  They took the cheapest seats on 
trains, and moved by truck and on foot even in bad 
weather�.  Actors had to take care of themselves or 
else risked getting sick, which could bring about a 
failure in their travel schedule�.
Some managers in theaters and the Federation 
were concerned with bettering the life of actors.  It 
was not enough only to appeal to actors to understand 
the state of affairs (jikyoku ninshiki) and to demand 
sacrifices for the state (shokuiki ho-ko-).  Because most 
of the actors had families in Tokyo, and some of them 
were quite popular in the big theaters�, the state was 
asked to provide health insurance (kenko- hoken) and 
pensions (yo-ro- nenkin) to support them�.  Neverthe-
less, the state did not provide any practical welfare 
policy for them.  The mobile theater movement did 
not in fact make participants healthy, but rather 
exhausted them.
Actors’ complaints arose.  After the war, Nagai 
Tomoo, an actor of Mizuho Theater, one of the mobile 
theater troupes at the time, published diaries written 
by his fellows during 1943 and mid 1945.  They com-
plained of hardships they faced during performances. 
They criticized the Federation for only emphasizing 
group etiquette such as greetings (ojigi) and courtesy 
(gyo-gi), as well as the number of performances rather 
than quality of plays (shibai).  They felt so tired not 
only physically but also mentally that they lost the 
motivation to improve their performance techniques. 
Diaries became the place where mobile theater partici-
pants could complain about the government and 
theater planners�.
Despite overworked conditions, mobile theater 
witnessed a sharp increase since the establishment of 
the Federation in 1941, in numbers of performances 
and audiences, as noted above.  The reason was partly 
because the state negotiated with audiences, as in the 
case of amateur theater.  Just as the war situation was 
becoming critical in the early 1940s, it was important 
to mobilize audiences into the realm of the state’s pro-
paganda.  Compared with its strictness in terms of 
discipline and network, the Federation showed a flexi-
ble attitude toward the arrangement of programs.  The 
Federation gave autonomy in both content and organi-
zation of programs to theaters, and allowed each 
troupe to present its own specialty.  Performances did 
not have to concentrate on war inspiration itself.  They 
were recommended to be interesting enough to attract 
the people’s attention, and the Federation allowed 
comic dialogues (manzai), light comedy (keiengeki), 
and variety shows�.
Theaters variously decided the contents and top-
ics of plays through discussion with each corporative 
organization to meet its goal.  For example, the indus-
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trial patriotic units preferred scenarios that inspired 
industrial warriors to increase coal production (sekitan 
zo-san undo-).  Because of its theme, Toward Increasing 
Production (Zo-san e), a play by the famous playwright 
Agi Osuke, was most often hosted by the industrial 
patriotic units�.  As if reflecting the urgency of coal 
production, the industrial patriotic units hosted more 
theater performances than any other corporative orga-
nizations.  From June 1941 to June 1943, the industrial 
patriotic units hosted 1,730 performances and report-
edly mobilized a total audience of 2,248,139 people. 
This number was much more than the agricultural 
cooperatives (609 performances and 693,880 people), 
the IRAA (718 performances and 866,828 people), 
and all the rest (386 performances and 578,220 peo-
ple) among a total of 3,443 performances and 
4,387,067 people�.
The IRAA, the corporatist political organization, 
emphasized the idea of unifying the government and 
the people into one body (kanmin ittai).  When the 
IRAA prepared an election of the House of Represen-
tatives (shu-giin) scheduled on April 30, 1942, it 
attempted to mobilize the people to vote for candidates 
recommended by the IRAA (yokusan senkyo).  The 
IRAA expected entertainment shows not to arouse 
antipathy among the people against politics but to 
attract audiences to go to see plays on seemingly bor-
ing issues like the political system or elections.  The 
Corps presented a variety show, the Power to Establish 
Greater East Asia, This One Ballot (Daito-a Kizuku 
Chikara da, Kono Ippyo-) written by the famous play-
wright Ima Uhei.  This consisted of ten scenes―Scene 
One: A song of the imperial assistance election, Scene 
Two: An election for the head of an elementary school 
class, Scene Three: Solo, Scene Four: Corrupt prac-
tices in a countryside election, Scene Five: A speech 
of a teacher criticizing corrupt election practices, 
Scene Six: News of Greater East Asia, and music, 
Scene Seven: Manzai, Scene Eight: The imperial 
assistance system in the countryside, Scene Nine: An 
oath of the imperial assistance election, and Scene 
Ten: A play�.
The problem was that some of the interesting pro-
grams could not necessarily satisfy all officials and 
theater specialists.  Sonoike Kin’naru, who was a pro-
gressive theater critic and guided amateur theaters, 
reviewed the Corps’ performance in Kanagawa pre-
fecture.  In the sense of entertaining the local people 
who would have little chance of enjoyment otherwise, 
ventriloquism and magic shows by the Corps were 
valuable to present, and they were indeed well 
received.  However, those programs, complained 
Sonoike, did not deal with critical issues such as the 
state’s corporative system and increasing production�. 
The main purpose of the mobile theater movement 
was to propagate these issues, but the Corps did not 
always follow the guidance of the Federation.  Taka-
hashi Kenji, a chief of the Division of Culture and 
Welfare (Bunka Ko-seibu) in the IRAA critically 
reported in his observation of one local performance 
that mobile theater did not provide better quality in 
terms of both style and content than the commercial 
productions�.
It is ambiguous as to what extent critics evaluated 
programs as good enough to present Japanese culture. 
One of the main concerns would be the Western cul-
tural influence from the urban visitors.  Some critics 
warned that mobile theater could provoke consump-
tion among the people in the countryside because 
many mobile theater groups presented commercial-
style shows such as skits, tap-dancing, rakugo, 
manzai, and variety shows�.  The Corps even pre-
sented a dance-play, Bo-shibari that the Takarazuka 
Girls’ Revue had performed in its overseas tour, with 
Western instruments.  However, Sugawara Taro- , a 
member of the Bureau of Information commented in 
his observation of the Corps’ performance in Kana-
gawa prefecture that the performance was generally 
“healthy” because it avoided Western elements.  For 
instance, the Corps did not use the Western imported 
term “tap-dancing,” but called it “rhythmic move-
ment” (ritsudo- undo-) instead.  It did not use jazz in 
tap-dancing, but, rather, adapted the sounds of tap-
dance to evoke trains, drums, and running horses in 
battlefields�.
The state did not demand clear criteria in the 
quality of the presentation style as long as the program 
was entertaining enough for the people.  Loose control 
of the program reflected a dilemma that the state faced 
in administering the movement.  First, the Federation 
did not manage enough troupes to cover all regions of 
mainland Japan.  Considering that there were about 
12,000 towns and villages in Japan, the Federation 
would have required at least 60 troupes, assuming that 
one troupe could give 200 performances per year.  If it 
counted factories and mines as well, more troupes 
73
Wartime Japan’s Theater Movement
would be necessary.  But, only a total of eleven 
troupes had become involved in the Federation by 
April 1943.  More importantly, as the process of estab-
lishing the Federation suggests, the mobile theater 
movement was based on the critical support of private 
organizations.  Most of the mobile theater groups 
came from commercial theaters.  The Federation 
owned only one team of Kuroganetai under its direct 
control (senzoku gekidan), and added two more 
troupes, called Azusatai and Hogarakatai when it set 
up a branch in Osaka in September 1941�.
Thus, the Federation had to share the cost with 
corporatist organizations and private theaters in the 
course of theater promotions because it lacked its own 
theaters.  The Federation paid the fee for conveyance 
and transportation from Tokyo to the nearest station of 
the visiting area; hosts paid for the transportation fees 
from the arrival station to the site of performance, as 
well as the performance fees, stage rent, food, and 
lodgings; and theater companies handled the stage 
facilities and personnel expenses�.90  Those three 
groups paid almost equal amounts of 60 to 130 yen for 
each performance, which cost about 250 to 300 yen 
total�.
The state’s dilemma was more critical in that the 
Federation sometimes could not always control the 
behavior of its audiences.  Critics often pointed out the 
bad manners of the audiences who disturbed perfor-
mances and disordered public spaces.  When he went 
to see the Corps’ performance for female workers in a 
raw silk factory, Sonoike criticized the fact that audi-
ences were more interested in the male actors than in 
the content of the performance.  At the time, a couple 
of famous actors, Ogino and Sumikawa of Nihon The-
ater, temporarily joined in the performance, and 
female audience members shouted during even the sad 
scenes, and disturbed the performance�.  The audi-
ences were apparently happy just to see such famous 
actors from the city�.  Children also made the per-
forming environment messy.  Disorderly audiences 
and their low level of appreciation of performances 
discouraged some of the actors from memorizing their 
scripts.  Some actors were seriously concerned over 
the decline in their performing techniques�.
Despite its efforts to control the network of 
mobile theater distribution, the Federation could not 
always oversee the promotion process, either.  The 
communication among the Federation, corporations, 
and theaters did not always go well, and sometimes 
the Federation did not give enough information 
regarding its guidelines to the countryside.  Even 
though the Federation strongly prohibited earning pri-
vate profits, some hosts took entrance fees from 
audiences.  One host invited a mobile theater group 
without any contact with the Federation and held its 
own production in order to make money�.
From the perspective of commercial theaters, the 
mobile theater movement was dealt a blow because 
they could not earn financial profit.  Theaters spent 
about 30,000 yen per year to maintain their mobile 
theater troupes.  But, the number of performances that 
each troupe provided during the year was about 150 to 
200 at the most because they spent off-days for travel 
(ido-), rest (kyu-yo-), rehearsal (keiko), and training (ren-
sei)�.  When the Corps performed at eight places in 
Nagano prefecture, it brought the company a total def-
icit of 420 yen because its total earning was only 400 
yen while the total expenditure was 820 yen.  The 
detailed breakdown of the expenditure was as fol-
lowed: 150 yen for costumes, 50 yen for stage 
properties, 30 yen for wigs, 50 yen for stage sets, 160 
yen salary for actors (1 yen per person a day), 120 yen 
for two temporary musicians, 100 yen transportation 
fee from Tokyo to Matsumoto, 60 yen in accommoda-
tion charges, 20 yen remuneration for script, and 80 
yen for miscellaneous expenses�.  Even when the 
Corps earned a profit, the amount was exceedingly 
small.  For example, their total earnings for perfor-
mances at eighteen places in Kanagawa prefecture was 
only 930 yen while the total expenditure was 908 
yen�.
Even though mobile theaters did not make a 
financial profit, they benefited from state patronage. 
The theaters had an opportunity to gain publicity 
nationwide and to expand the range of their audiences 
into local areas.  The theaters propagated their public 
role as state messengers and as providing a service for 
the people.  Local audiences sent letters to the Federa-
tion, and expressed their impressions on performances 
and their gratitude toward actors’ providing entertain-
ment services and amusement for the local people for 
free.  Some audiences even expressed how beautiful 
the language of Tokyo was, and expected mobile the-
ater activity to spread the standard Japanese language 
throughout all of Asia�.  The mobile theater move-
ment did not simply spread urban culture.  Actors from 
74
早稲田大学高等研究所紀要　創刊号
the cities learned about local cultures, including folk-
ish dances, music, food, and legendary stories by 
participating in informal discussions and entertain-
ments with local people.  Actors reported on their 
experiences in the countryside, and expressed grati-
tude for the welcome and kindness with which they 
were greeted by the local people()100.
Theaters were also expected to propagate their 
public activities for the state to the people in Tokyo. 
Even though the local areas were the main sites for 
mobile theaters, the Federation sometimes allowed the 
theaters to perform in Tokyo.  It held the first compre-
hensive event for mobile theater at the People’s New 
Theater (Kokumin Shin’gekijo-) in Tsukiji from Janu-
ary 9 to 15 in 1942.  Theaters presented programs 
performed in local areas and displayed an exhibition 
on their off-stage activities 101().  The Tokyo performance 
was expected to make up for the theaters’ deficits 
incurred in local areas()102.  It was not for free but was in 
fact quite expensive.  When the Federation hosted a 
special event to celebrate its success over two years at 
Ho-gakuza (the Theater for Japanese Music) in Tokyo 
from June 20 to 29 in 1943, the entrance fee (tax 
included) was 3.80 yen for first-class seats and 1.60 
yen for second-class seats, and even a discounted 
ticket for industrial warriors (sangyo- senshi) was 1.00 
or 2.00 yen()103.
Furthermore, mobile theaters expected to publi-
cize themselves outside of mainland Japan, and they 
looked for promotional opportunities in Asia.  Takara-
zuka dispatched theater corps to North China from 
August to September 1939, right after its U.S. tour 
team had returned to Japan from America in July()104, 
and Takarazuka expanded its theater activity into 
Mongolia, French-Indochina, and later the South Seas. 
<Figure 4.> Takarazuka collaborated with the Ministry 
of Foreign Affairs to invite female dancers from Thai-
land and French-Indochina to Takarazuka.  They 
developed cultural relations with those Asians, and 
attempted to absorb the diverse dances of Asia into the 
unified cultural sphere of the Japanese empire()105.  To-ho-  
Dance Corps also had its first performance in Chosen 
in June 1940, and went to Manchuria, China, and 
French Indochina in 1941 to amuse soldiers.  On 
March 14, 1943, Shibusawa led 55 members of this 
troupe to Central China.  Members of the To-ho-  Dance 
Corps had about eighty performances at big theaters in 
Shanghai and Nanjing over thirty-seven days, and 
mobilized a total audience of 100,000 people.  They 
also had sixty-eight performances for Japanese sol-
diers in China()106.  <Figure 5.>
Dispatching cultural troupes to Asia coincided 
with the state’s goals.  With the outbreak of the Pacific 
War in 1941, Japanese officials strengthened war 
mobilization in the colonies and increased efforts to 
expand Japanese imperialism into the empire.  In the 
17th meeting for trustees (hyo-giin) on June 27, 1941, 
Nagai, the managing director (rijicho-) of the KBS 
emphasized propaganda within the Greater Sphere of 
East Asia.  The KBS seemed to revise its policies that 
had focused on the activities toward the Western pow-
ers.  The Bureau of Information set up the Committee 
of Cultural Affairs for the Southern Area (Nanpo-  
Bunka Jigyo-  Iinkai) within the KBS and expanded 
human networks in occupied regions like French Indo-
china and Thailand.  Moreover, the KBS made a 
cultural treaty with Thailand in October 1942, and set 
up the Center for Culture of Japan and Thailand 
(Nichi-Tai Bunka Kaikan).  The Bureau of Informa-
tion and the KBS invited scholars, artists, and 
translators from Thailand, Burma, Malaysia, Philip-
Figure 4.　 Performances in French-Indochina.  Source: 
Toho jūnenshi (Tokyo: Tokyo Takarazuka 
Gekijō, 1943).  Courtesy of Toho Company 
Ltd.
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pines, Java, and Sumatra, and they promoted 
exchanges of books and arts.  By expanding this Asian 
network, it aimed to deliver messages to Asians about 
Japan’s superior aspects.  The KBS published docu-
ments such as “Elementary School Education” 
(kokumin gakko- kyo-iku) and “Heavy Industries” 
(ju-ko-gyo-) in the languages of East Asia for propagan-
dizing Japan’s industrial development and modern 
schooling.  Japanese language education programs for 
Asians also increased in importance, with the govern-
ment’s ambition of confirming it as a common 
language (kyo-tsu-go) within the East Asian cultural 
sphere()107.
Japanese cultural propagandists emphasized Asi-
anness, too.  Asian cultural expressions were 
encouraged for the benefit of the empire.  The ideol-
ogy of New Japanism was expected to spread 
throughout Asia by seducing the colonized people into 
watching and participating in mobile theaters()108.  The 
Federation dispatched troupes to Hokkaido- , Sakhalin, 
Chosen, Taiwan, Ryu-kyu- , Manchuria, China, and 
Nanyo- 109() to amuse soldiers of the empire (ko-gun) on 
the front and to mobilize the audiences in occupied 
territories()110.  However, programs for Asian audiences 
were not exactly the same as that for Westerners.  For 
example, the Revue focused on the mixture of Western 
techniques and traditional elements when it performed 
in Western Europe and the United States.  On the other 
hand, the “folkishness” (junboku) of the Japanese 
nation was much emphasized for Asian perfor-
mances 111().  Local dances, music, costumes, and songs 
from the countryside of Japan and around Asia were 
presented, though it is not clear whether they used 
Western techniques like tap dance and jazz()112.
With the end of the war, mobile troupes ended 
their theater activities to mobilize the imperial subjects 
in Asia.  Some of the members of the troupes, who 
were scattered all over Asia, waited for a chance to 
return to Japan while being forced to find a way to 
make a living.  They performed for the Soviet soldiers 
and the Japanese workers in Asia, or worked at caba-
rets, casinos, and military bases()113.  Other Japanese 
troupes then adapted themselves to a new audience, 
the American occupation forces.
5. Conclusion
In the wartime context, the meaning of culture 
was contested among the officials and social commen-
tators, theater groups, and the ordinary people. The 
state officials produced the term culture as a tool of 
Figure 5.　 Performances in China.  Source: Toho jūnenshi (Tokyo: Tokyo Takarazuka 
Gekijō, 1943).  Courtesy of Toho Company Ltd.
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war mobilization, which was expected to reduce social 
discontent, to improve manpower, to save money, and 
to control the people.  Sharing most of these purposes 
with the officials, social commentators interpreted the 
notion of culture as a kind of welfare for the people. 
People in cities and the countryside learned the state 
ideology by watching mobile theater actors’ perfor-
mances, as well as practiced those ideas of 
cooperation, thrift, public order, and sacrifices for the 
state by participating in amateur theater activities 
themselves. This paper proves that the Japanese state 
succeeded to persuade commercial theaters to share 
financial burdens and human resources in expanding 
the theater movement. This provided the private sector 
with partial autonomy, and the state encountered the 
dilemma that it could not control the whole practice of 
the movement.
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